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PUEBLO OF SANDIA,
Plaintiff,

Civ. No. 94-2624
(HHG)

v.
BRUCE H. BABBITT, st alL,
Defendants.

OPINION
This matter is presently before the Court on the
parties' cross-motion? for summary judgment. Plaintiff sued
defsndznts, chailenging that defendants' refusal to correct
an allegedly erroneous land survey constituted a violation
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 5 551 st seaCI
('APA").

Plaintiff as~edthis Court to order a corrected

survey and to declare ckat the corrected boundary is the
true boundary. Upon co~~sid~re
tion of the parties ' mot ~ons,-- oppositions, replies ar.d che entire record in this case, the
Court concludes that plaintiff's motion will be granted and
that defendants' motion will be denied.

I

Backcrround
The disputed claim area consists of about 10,000 acres
of rugged wilderness on the western slope of Sandia Peak
near Albuquerque, New Mexico.

The vast majority of the

r'

--

disputed parcel is owned by the United States government and
is currently managed by the United States Forest Serviceof
the Department of Agriculture.

A small percentage of the

government-owned parcel has been developed for recreational
use, in the form of hiking trails, picnic areas, and through
a U.S. Forest Service special use permit issued to Sandia
Peak Ski Company and Sandia Peak Tram Company. About 600
acres of the disputed claim have been transferred by the
government to private owners and developed for single-family
homes.

The Pueblo has specifically disclaimed any interest

in or claim to these private lands and interests.
The Pueblo of Sandia has occupied its present location
since about 1300 A.D.

In 1748, the King of Spain issued a

royal grant to the Pueblo of Sandia in the Spanish language.
The official English translation of this grant includes a
description of the physical act of conveying the lacd and
the directions given to the people as to how to mark their
boundaries.

That translation, called the 'Whiting

translation" after the translator, reports:
[Iln order to perpetuate their boundaries, I directed
them to establish ladmarks,
the boundaries being
on the north an old tower opposite the point of a canon
commonly called 'De la acpa," and on the south the
Maygua hill opposite he spring of the Carrisito, and
on the east the main ridge called Sandia.

...

Administrative Record at 1834. The plaintiff alleges that
this lans~ageset the Pueblo's eastern boundary at Sandia

Peak.

Pursuant to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (which

ratified all land grants made by the Spanish), in 1858
-.

Congress officially confirmed the 1748 Spanish grant to the
Pueblo and ordered a survey to be made of the Pueblo's
boundary.
The Surveyor-General, an official of the Department of
the Interior (hereinafter sometimes 'Department"), ordered
one Reuben Clements to survey the Pueblo lands according to
the boundaries specified in the royal grant confirmed by
Congress. Clements did not survey the eastern boundary.at
the crest o£ Sandia Peak, but at the foethills to the west
of the mountain, a difference of about 10,000 acres--the
land at issue.

For over a hundred years after Clementst

survey, the people of Sandia have continued to worship at
the,shrines and sacred areas within the claim area. The
Sandia religious tradition requires that this worship be
both secret and private, but recently-as a-resultof
activity by the Forest Ser~icein this area, it became more
difficult for the Sandia to worship in privacy.
To address these interferences with its religious
practices, the Pueblo of Sandia presented a formal claim to
the Secretary of the Interior in 1983 for a clarification of
the eastern boundary of their grant.

A number of Interior

Department officials were involved in evaluating the
Pueblo's claim. The Interior Department considered several
3

studies and analyses conducted by academics, historians and
other professionals in related fields, with the goal ofdetermining what was actually given by the original Spanish
grant, and how if it all, that differed from the land
included in the survey of the Pueblo's land.

The majority

sentiment, reflected in an unofficial draft opinion
authorized by Associate Solicitor for Indian Affairs Timothy
Vollman, was that the Pueblo's claim was meritorious. This
opinion was then sent to the General Counsel at the
Department of '~griculturefor comment (the disputed area was
at that time under the control of the Department of
Agriculture) .
Officials at the Agriculture Department improperly
released the draft to the public, resulting in a significant
delay in resolution of the Pueblo's claim as well as an even
more significant change of opinion.

During the year and a

half in between the Agriculture Department received the
draft and the time it was issued to the public in final
form, the Department of the Interior received dozens of
comments from the public and government officials on this
issue.

The result was that the Department of the Interior

issued a final opinion ('Tarr Opinion") rejecting the
Pueblo's claim that was endorsed by Secretary of the
Interior Donald Hodel in December, 1988.
filed this action December 7, 1994.
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The Pueblo then

II
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of R e v i a

Summary judgment may be granted only if there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
56(c); Celotex Cprp. v. -,

FED. R. CIV. P.

477 U.S. 317, 321-23

(1986). The parties, and the Court, agree that there is no
genuine factual dispute that is material to the question of
whether the Interior Department acted arbitrarily or
capriciously.' Concerning the issue of whether the
Department's decision making process was tainted by improper
poLitica1 influence, however, the parties diverge.
Defendants, believing no genuine dispute of material fact
exists relevant to this question, have moved for summary
judgment.

Plaintiff believes that a material question of

fact exists, and therefore argues that summary judgment is
inappropriate on that question.
The role of a court in reviewing final agency actions
is limited.

Section 706 of the APA provides that a court

may set aside an agency action only where it finds the.
action 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuseof discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law."
706(2) (A).

5 U.S.C.

§

.

.

Under this standard, there is a presumption in

favor of the validity of administrative action, and a court
may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
5

ens to Preserve Overton Park v. Vo-,
416 (1971).

401 U.S. 402,

Essentially, this is an inquiry into "whether
. .

the decision was based on a consideration of relevant
factors and whether there has been a clear error of
judgment." -ton

P&,

401 U.S. at 416.

The court must

also find that the relevant factors on which the decision is
based are supported by some evidence. Bitter Tzansportation

U . v - I=,

684 F.2d 86, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

The Court

now applies these principles to the parties' motion for
summary judgmdnt

.
I11

Plaintiff's complaint alleges two violations of the
APA.

First, it argues that the Secretary of the Interior

acted arbitrarily in his adoption of Solicitor Tarr's
opinion against the Pueblo.

Second,-plaintiffargues that

the Secretary abused his discretion when he made the
decision to adopt Solicitor Tarr's decision based on
improper political pressure.
addressed in turn.

These arguments will be

of -ess.

A.

Not in Acc-e

-ness

or AcLxal-

with lad
.- -.

This Court has already concluded that the Secretary of
the Interior has the authority to issue a corrected survey.
December 10, 1996 Opinion at 21.

Finding now that the.

government owes a fiduciary duty to the Pueblo, the Court
concludes that the Department breached this duty by failing
to correct the Pueblo's boundary to reflect the inclusion of
the Sandia mountains up to their crest.
Given 'the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent
upor, the Government in its dealings with these dependent and
sometimes exploited people," the question of whether the
government has a duty to issue a corrected survey to restore
the Pueblo the rights to their land is hardly a difficult
one for the Court, and cerits little discussion.

United

v. Mitchell, 4 6 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) (quoting
S e - w

v. Unit&..Statea,

316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942).

'Ihia trust relationshf2, akin to a common law fiduciary
duty, see w

f v&a,

877 F.2d 1058, 1064 (D.C.

Clr. 19891, has 'long'dominated the Government's dealings
with Indians."

,

E
Jicarillz-Uche Tribe v. S w r o n -

728 F.2d 1555, 1563 (10th Cir. 1984) (Seymour, J.

dissenting).

The more difficult question for the Court is

whether the government breached this duty and acted
arbitrarily or capriciously by failing to issue a corrected
survey.
7

The Department degan its analysis of this issue 'with
the usual presumption that surveys of the United States-are
. .
correct and in compliance with statutory requirements."
Tarr Opinion at 12 (quoting 11 C.J.S.

§

104). The
.

government placed the burden on the claimant to establish by
a preponderance of the evidence that 'the survey was
fraudulent or grossly erroneous." Id, (citation omitted).
Sixteen pages later in its legal analysis, the Department
mentions that it is "mindful of the general canon of
construction that legal arnkiguities in treaties and statutes
passed for the benefit of Indians should be resolved tc the
Indianst benefit."

at 28 (citation omitted). Eecause

the congressional intent of tne statute that confirmed the
S~arlishland grant to the Pueblo is clear and because the
Pueblo failed to show 'sufficient ambiguity" to trigger the
Indian-favoring canon of construction, the Department
concluded that the Pueblo's claim should fail.
Upon review of the Tarr Opinion and the governing legal
principles, the Court finds that the Department's conclusion
cannot stand as a matter of law.

Principally, the Tarr

Opinion unjustifiably denigrates the Indian-favoring policy
and elevates the presumption of survey regularity.. The case
law articulating the Indian-favoring policy is longstanding
and absolute.

The Department failed to respect this policy,

and instead wrongfully relied upon the presumption that
8

surveys are correct, forcing the Pueblo to satisfy an
unnecessarily high burden to vindicate their claim.

T h.e..

Pueblo presented an eminently reasonable interpretation of
the circumstances surrounding the grant of their land, and
therefore--had the Department properly considered the
Indian-favoring policy--the Pueblo should have prevailed.

. .

855 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc), modlfled on other crrowda,

793 F.2d 1171 (10th cir. 1986) (because tribe's alternative
interpretation was reasonable and best promoted their

'

interest, Interior Department should have accepted it) .I
Rather, the Department here avoided true application of
the Indian-favoring policy by proclaiming that the Pueblo
had failed to identify the requisite ambiguity for
triggering that canon.

The Court is perplexed that the

Department dared claim lack of ambiguity in the present
case. While the co~igressioilalintent to confirm the land

h he reasohableness of the Pueblo's interpretation
becomes even more apparent in light of the fact that
numerous other Department officials agreed with the Pueblo.
Those who would have corrected the survey to include the
land up to the crest of the Sierra Madre include the
Director of the Office of Trust Responsibilities, Bureau of
Indian Affairs (1983) and the Associate Solicitor for'Indian
Affairs (1987). Even Solicitor Tarr originally found the
Pueblo's claim compelling (1987). While these opinions may
not represent official agency position, they do persuade the
Court that this case presented a very close call and that
therefore the Indian-favoring policy mandated a result in
favor of the Pueblo.

that the Pueblo already owned may be quite clear, the
question of exactly what land the Pueblo already owned at
the time of the 1858 statute is not clear at all.

Although

the Department found evidence of intent to create a formal
pueblo, the Court finds equally compelling evidence that the
custom of granting a formal pueblo was often abandoned.

For

example, the Pueblo show that the Spanish authorities
granted the Acoma Pueblo more than five times the area of a
formal pueblo, and the Santo Domingo Pueblo more than four
times the area of a formal pueblo.

Thus, the custom of.

granting a formal pueblo--so strongly relied upon by the
government to support its denial of the plaintiff's claim-was certainly not an immutable rule that should override the
langxage of the Spanish land grant or evidence of the

--

specific surrounding circumstances.
Inc?eed, a brief perusal of the administrative record

convinces the Court that the ci-ccumstances surrounding the
Pueblo land grant are ambigucus. Experts with much more
knowledge and familiarity with the Pueblo's circumstances
hold vastly differing opinions as to the proper
interpretation of the Spanish land grant. The Tarr Opinion
discusses the various interpretations, and yet myopically
fails to find ambiguity. The Court finds that this error
led to another error, the failure to apply the Indianfavoring policy.

Simply put, the Department failed to
10

I

follow "that eminently sound and vital canon

. . . that

..statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes

. . . are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions
being resolved in favor of the Indians." w a n v. It-

-,

426 U.S. 373,. 392 (1976).

Therefore, the decision

of the Department of the Interior cannot stand.

. .

oFer Politual Press-

EL

Plaintiff also claims that the Interior Department's
fiecision-making process was tainted by improper politicdl
influence.

However, because the Court finds that the

Department otherwise violate? the APA,

Part III.A, there

is no need to discuss plaintiff's other claims.
,
-

IV
For the above reasons, the Court finas that the
Department of the Interior violated the APA when it issued
an opinion denying the Pueblo of Sandistsclaim for a
corrected land'survey,. Therefore, the Department's decision
to deny the Pueblo's claim shall be vacated.

The case shall
- .

be remanded to the Interior Department for agency action
consistent with this Opinion. An Order in accordance with
this Opinion is being issued
. .

.-.

Harold H. Greene
United States District Judge
Date:

-
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BRUCE IT. BABBIlT,

ct,

Defendants.

Upon consideration of the parties' cross-motions for
sumnary judgment, the entire record in this case, and the
Opinion issued this day, ic is this /

day of

1998,

#%

ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be

and it is hereby GRANTED: an2 it is further
O3DERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment be

and ic is hereby DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Department of Interior Memorandum

written k,y Solfcitor Ralph Tarr and accepted by Seoetary

-

Donald Wodel on Decembar 13, 1988 be and it is hereby
VACATED; asd it is funher

ORDERED that the above-captioned case be and it is

hereby remanded to the Department of the Interior for action
coruistent with the attached Cplr~ionand this Order.

L.
HAROLD

L*

H. GREENE
United States District Judge

